U.S. public support for Taiwan’s defense – as evidenced by a recent CSIS study – is also critical to deterring Chinese military action.
President Tsai Ing-wen’s re-election in Taiwan in January has been met with growing assertiveness from China. Beijing’s ramped up military pressure against Taiwan has renewed questions about whether the United States would intervene if the island faced a blockade or invasion. Although the U.S. Congress has consistently signaled strong support for Taiwan, there has historically been less enthusiasm among the American public. However, new data suggests these views may be changing.
Annual surveys conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA) consistently show tepid enthusiasm for Taiwan’s defense among the American public. The recently released 2020 poll revealed that a mere 41 percent of Americans backed military action were China to invade Taiwan. Although hardly a ringing endorsement, these results show the highest level of support for Taiwan’s defense since CCGA first posed the question to the public in 1982.
Were a contingency to arise in the Taiwan Strait, public pressure could hamstring a robust U.S. response and prove disastrous for Taipei. The CCGA surveys suggest that views among the public are slowly changing, and a newly released study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) offers further insight into how these perspectives are evolving.
This summer, CSIS surveyed the American public and thought leaders in the United States, Asia, and Europe to map perspectives on China and U.S. defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific (the authors were part of the research team). We asked respondents to gauge on a scale of 1 to 10 how important it is to defend U.S. allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific should they come under threat from China. These questions were designed so that a score of “1” meant it was not worth taking any risk to protect an ally or partner, and a “10” meant it was worth taking a significant risk.
The results show that Americans are, in fact, prepared to take a substantial risk to defend Taiwan. With a mean score of 6.69 out of 10, respondents from among the U.S. public gave stronger backing for defending Taiwan than Australia (6.38) and comparable to Japan (6.88), South Korea (6.92), as well as an unnamed ally or partner in the South China Sea (6.97).
Differences in views were most pronounced across different age cohorts. Older Americans (over 67 years old) proved to be the most willing to defend Taiwan, but there was a statistically significant gap between senior citizens and younger Americans (18-30 years old), who were the least supportive. Age proved to be a determining factor elsewhere in the study. Younger Americans showed only modest interest in defending partners in the region. This position is likely born out of the fact that our study also revealed that 50 percent of younger Americans think war with China is likely and another 15 percent believe it is inevitable.
Our project also tracked converging and diverging perspectives between the public and thought leaders. Across the board, thought leaders more enthusiastically supported defending partners in the region – including Taiwan. With a mean score of 7.93 out of 10, thought leaders demonstrated a willingness to take a considerable risk with regard to Taiwan, albeit somewhat less than the average mean score of 8.72 among U.S. treaty allies (Australia, Japan, and South Korea).
Of the constituencies polled, human rights experts pegged Taiwan’s defense as the highest security priority, more so than all other U.S. allies and partners in the study. An impressive 57 percent of individuals who self-identified as being from the human rights community rated their response with the highest possible score of 10.
We expected thought leaders to prioritize Taiwan. Many within the policy community have, for years, labored to counter Chinese coercion against Taiwan and strengthen the island’s security. There is also strong bipartisan support for Taiwan in the U.S. Congress. What was revealing was the degree to which experts were willing to accept risk on behalf of Taiwan’s security.
Although tempered, we were surprised to also find support for Taiwan among the American public. The public is less inclined than thought leaders to incur risk overseas, but they did rate the defense of Taiwan of similar importance to that of long-standing allies.
This latter point provides a more refined understanding of how the public thinks about Taiwan compared to what can be gleaned from other surveys. One of the clearest findings from our data was that the public is significantly concerned about China. Fifty-four percent of Americans see China as the biggest challenge to the United States, more than double the amount primarily concerned about Russia (22 percent). Those most worried about China are, unsurprisingly, also those most interested in defending partners like Taiwan.
China’s growing assertiveness in the region almost certainly plays a role in souring public opinion. Beijing has continued to rachet up its pressure campaign against Taipei, which ranges from disinformation campaigns to poaching some of Taiwan’s few remaining diplomatic allies. Over the last several months, Chinese military aircraft have made an unprecedented number of incursions across the median line of the Taiwan Strait.
While many of these provocations may go unnoticed by those outside the policy community, Taiwan’s precarious position as a small, vibrant democracy on the doorstep of China is more visible than ever. Rising authoritarianism, much of which stems from or is supported by Beijing, poses a fundamental threat to the U.S.-led international order. Leaders from both political parties have brought these shifting dynamics to the forefront of public discourse on foreign policy.
The ongoing coronavirus pandemic likely also colors public opinion. With the pandemic continuing to rage across the United States, it logical that Americans are seeking effective government responses elsewhere. Taiwan boasts one of the most advanced health care systems in the world and provides universal coverage to the island’s 23 million inhabitants. COVID-19 has had a much smaller impact on Taiwan than other industrialized economies, and the international community has lauded Taipei’s effective handling of the outbreak.
Deterrence necessitates that China believes that the United States is likely to intervene should it attack Taiwan. The first step in making deterrence credible is ensuring that the U.S. military has the capabilities necessary to defend Taiwan and that Taiwan does its part to reinforce its security. Yet, public support for Taiwan’s defense – as evidenced by the recent CSIS study – is also critical. It demonstrates a robust commitment to overseas partners, which in turn serves to bolster peace and stability in the region.
Bonnie S. Glaser is senior advisor for Asia and director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
Matthew P. Funaiole is a senior fellow with the China Power Project and senior fellow for data analysis with the iDeas Lab at CSIS.
CSIS最近的一項研究證明，美國民眾對台灣國防的支持對遏制中國的軍事行動也至關重要。
蔡英文在今年一月再次當選台灣總統時，中國的自信心日益增強。北京對台灣施加的軍事壓力加大了，人們再次質疑如果該島面臨封鎖或入侵，美國是否會進行干預。儘管美國國會一貫表示對台灣的大力支持，但從歷史上看，美國公眾的熱情有所下降。但是，新數據表明這些觀點可能正在改變。
芝加哥全球事務理事會（CCGA）進行的年度調查始終表明，台灣民眾對台灣國防的熱情不高。最近發布的2020年民意調查顯示，只有41％的美國人支持軍事行動是中國入侵台灣。這些結果雖然鮮為人知，但顯示出自CCGA於1982年首次向公眾提出該問題以來，對台灣國防的最高支持。
如果是在台灣海峽發生緊急情況，公眾壓力可能會阻礙美國的強勁反應，並給台北帶來災難性的後果。 CCGA的調查表明，公眾的觀點正在慢慢改變，戰略與國際研究中心（CSIS）近期發布的一項研究進一步揭示了這些觀點的發展趨勢。
今年夏天，CSIS對美國公眾，美國，亞洲和歐洲的思想領袖進行了調查，以期就中國和美國在亞太地區的國防承諾提出觀點（作者是研究小組的成員）。我們要求受訪者以1到10的比例來衡量，如果美國盟友和合作夥伴受到來自中國的威脅，保衛美國盟友和合作夥伴有多重要。設計這些問題時，得分為“ 1”表示不值得冒險保護盟友或伴侶，而得分為“ 10”則意味著值得冒重大風險。
結果表明，事實上，美國人準備冒很大的風險捍衛台灣。美國民眾的平均得分為6.69（滿分10分），在捍衛台灣方面得到的支持比澳大利亞（6.38）和日本（6.88），韓國（6.92）以及美國的無名盟友或合夥人可比。南海（6.97）。
在不同年齡段的人群中，觀點差異最為明顯。事實證明，年齡較大的美國人（67歲以上）是最願意捍衛台灣的人，但從統計上看，老年人和年長的美國人（18至30歲）之間的差距非常大，後者的支持程度最低。在研究的其他地方，年齡被證明是決定性因素。較年輕的美國人對捍衛該地區的伙伴只表現出很小的興趣。這種立場很可能是由於我們的研究還表明，50％的年輕美國人認為可能與中國發生戰爭，另有15％的人認為這是不可避免的事實。
我們的項目還跟踪了公眾和思想領袖之間的共同點和分歧點。全體思想領袖更加熱情地支持了包括台灣在內的該地區的捍衛夥伴。思想領袖的平均得分為7.93（滿分10分），表明他們願意冒台灣方面的重大風險，儘管這個分數略低於美國條約盟友（澳大利亞，日本和韓國）的平均得分（8.72）。
在接受調查的選區中，人權專家認為台灣的防務工作是安全的重中之重，比其他所有美國盟友和合作夥伴都高。自我識別為人權社區的個人中，有令人印象深刻的57％的人將自己的回答評為最高評分10分。
我們希望思想領袖優先考慮台灣。多年來，政策界內部的許多人一直在努力抵抗中國對台灣的脅迫，並加強該島的安全。美國國會也強烈支持台灣兩黨。揭示的是專家們願意為台灣的安全承擔風險的程度。
儘管受到挫折，但我們驚訝地發現美國公眾也對台灣給予了支持。公眾比思想領袖更不願意在海外招致風險，但是他們的確對台灣的防禦與長期盟友的防禦同樣重要。
與其他調查相比，後一點可以使公眾更加了解台灣。我們的數據最清楚的發現之一是，公眾對中國的關注極大。 54％的美國人認為中國是美國面臨的最大挑戰，是主要關注俄羅斯的國家（22％）的兩倍以上。毫不奇怪，那些最擔心中國的人也是對捍衛台灣等合作夥伴最感興趣的人。
幾乎可以肯定，中國在該地區日益自信的舉動在使輿論惡化方面發揮了作用。北京繼續加大對台北的壓力運動，從虛假信息運動到偷獵台灣剩餘的少數外交盟友中的一部分。在過去的幾個月中，中國軍機在台灣海峽中線進行了空前的入侵。
儘管許多挑釁行為可能會被政策界之外的人們所忽略，但台灣作為中國大陸門前小而活躍的民主國家的pre可危地位比以往任何時候都更加明顯。不斷增長的威權主義主要源於北京或得到北京的支持，對以美國為首的國際秩序構成了根本威脅。兩個政黨的領導人都將這些變化的動力帶到了公眾對外交政策的論述的最前沿。
正在進行的冠狀病毒大流行也可能使輿論蒙上陰影。隨著大流行在美國各地的蔓延，美國人在其他地方尋求有效的政府對策是合乎邏輯的。台灣擁有世界上最先進的醫療保健系統之一，為台灣2300萬居民提供了全民醫療服務。與其他工業化經濟體相比，COVID-19對台灣的影響要小得多，國際社會讚揚台北對疫情的有效處理。
威懾使中國有必要相信，如果美國攻擊台灣，美國可能會進行干預。使威懾力可信的第一步是確保美軍擁有捍衛台灣所必需的能力，並確保台灣盡其所能加強其安全。然而，最近的CSIS研究證明，公眾對台灣國防的支持也至關重要。它顯示了對海外合作夥伴的堅定承諾，反過來又有助於加強該地區的和平與穩定。
Bonnie S. Glaser是戰略與國際研究中心（CSIS）的亞洲高級顧問和中國電力項目總監。
Matthew P. Funaiole是中國電力項目的高級研究員，也是CSIS iDeas實驗室的數據分析高級研究員。
SOURCE THE DIPLOMAT By Bonnie S. Glaser and Mathew P. Funaiole